Abstract: During this interactive workshop, we will use simulation models about (potential) refugee crises. First, we will show how an exploratory system dynamics model on the Syrian-European refugee crisis (esp. the Balkan route) can be used interactively to provide high-level policy advice. The model and map-based animations we will be using were developed and used in November 2015. Going back to November 2015, we will use different techniques to assess and analyse effects of scenarios and potential policy options under deep uncertainty. Second, we will do this for potential future refugee crises. Sets of scenarios proposed by groups of workshop participants will be included into a simulation model to generate ensembles of plausible scenarios. We will visualize the effects of exemplar scenarios from these ensembles on maps and test policy options suggested by the workshop participants across all scenarios. Finally, we will use group model building techniques to develop a better understanding of the essence of migration as a security issue, and find structural policies.

Abstract: Military forces operate in an environment consisting of many intertwined influences, factors and actors that affect one another, complicating the situation and impacting stability. This presentation will discuss several concepts in order to make sense of this complex security environment and aims at challenging researchers to develop practical approaches that enable combining these concepts. We will discuss how the operational environment can be defined as a dynamic ecosystem consisting of flows between actors and factors that create the forces that influence the conflict. We will also introduce the concept of fighting in three landscapes, meaning that flows can be tackled in the physical landscape, the information landscape (cyber) and the human landscape (identity and beliefs that determine behaviour). In order to restore security, or enhance resilience before security deteriorates, we need to sufficiently understand and monitor these complex ecosystems. Furthermore to be effective in this complex environment a whole of society approach is needed in which military assets are only one of the effectors. Coordination in such a joint international, multi-agency, public (JIMP) setting creates many challenges of its own.

Abstract: The world is a complex adaptive system, that is to say a system of many component parts where the behaviour of the system cannot be inferred from the behaviour of the components in isolation. This is particularly true of combat when two or more intelligent parties are each trying to achieve advantage in a dynamic situation. These situations have been traditionally examined by the use of wargames, which require humans to make the decisions or simulations often based on scripts or simple rule sets to define the behaviour. Both of these methods mean that only a small subset of the possible ?phase space? of reasonable courses of action for each side in any given situation are explored. An imperfect but useful analogy would be that it?s like trying to understand chess from examining a small number of games. In order to address this, Dstl have been developing a tool ?Mission Planner? which will automatically generate courses of action for all sides within a simulation and respond to the perceived enemy responses. This should allow the automatic generation of a wide variety of courses of action for both sides given the same starting conditions and thus provide insight in to the range of outcomes possible. The talk will discuss the progress of the Mission Planner, describe its strengths and weaknesses, its future use and development.

Abstract: The complexity of our growing dependency on cyber systems increases the need to understand them in multi-faceted mathematical terms. Without a comprehensive and methodical understanding of these systems, unintended outcomes can be large and impactful. This creates a need for simple, analytically tractable yet practically insightful models for understanding these systems and their security. In this discussion, we start by building upon an existing model called FlipIt, extending it into a scenario involving a probabilistic attacker and defender playing for control over a resource. We then present an incomplete information game-theoretic model of the attacker-defender interaction. Using the martingale-based approach, we analytically solve the model for defender strategies. Afterward, we compare the analytical solution to a simulation and extend the simulation for cases that cannot be treated analytically. Finally, we compare and contrast with existing approaches based on Stackelberg equilibria.

Abstract: Terrorism is, by definition, violence driven by a sociopolitical or religious ideology that resides in a larger cultural worldview.? Worldviews and ideologies are complex systems ?that emerge from the complex causal interaction of cognitive, affective, and social factors.? As is true with all complex systems, they evolve in ways that can be surprising and hard to predict? (Home-Dixon et al 2013). This is certainly true of the dynamic and complex set of ideas called Jihadist ideology that arguably motivated those carrying out the recent wave of attacks in Brussels, Paris, and Istanbul.?I will describe the master narrative of Islamic Jihadism and how this narrative is supported by the larger Islamic worldview.?I will also discuss why some of our counter-terrorism rhetoric and actions can have the counterintuitive result of supporting elements of the Jihadist narrative. I will end with a suggestion on how the ideology-as-complex-system approach can help us design a more effective strategy for countering Islamic Jihadism

Abstract: One of the most complex challenges societies currently face is the threat of terrorism. In order to adequately prevent terrorism, law enforcement agencies and intelligence services need to shift from prosecuting crime to anticipating crime. In this approach the discovery of the narrative of a terrorist organisation seems to be crucial. Pandora Intelligence, in cooperation with TNO, developed an innovative scenario-model that can be used to detect narratives in crime-related data. These narratives can be used to support law-enforcement agencies to effectively anticipate criminal behaviour. Moreover, the scenario-model may be used to create ?alter-narratives?, intervention-options that neutralise the narrative of the adverse party. In this presentation the challenges that intelligence agencies are facing will be discussed. The enormous quantities of complex data hide unknown, and potentially useful information. A film scenario approach - as used in the film industry- show potential to turn this complex data into actionable intelligence products. Moreover, like filmmakers, terrorists use a narrative, a central storyline that defines the behaviour of the individuals involved. Combining scenarios from films and books with real incidents, offers an added value in understanding the mind-set of a terrorist. The added value of the creativity of filmmakers and scenario writers will also be addressed as they offer support in the creative thinking process required to counter-terrorism.

Abstract: The hyper connectivity of the society yields that terrorism and past and on-going violent conflicts are extremely dynamic and volatile and often not contained within national borders or ideologies. Therefore, understanding opponent behaviour has become more than ever essential, reinforcing Sun Tzu writings in 5th Century BC ?If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles? (Art of War). However, limited modelling is available to provide insight into the effect of interventions on opponents and in particular on opponent resilience. Not only considering the modus operandi and its directed chain of actions that leads to an attack, or to criminal events, is important. It is also essential to analyse opponent resillience in the context of the opponent organization, its social networks, the society and physical environment in which it takes place, as all these aspects may influence each other.This paper explores the combination of Agent-Based Modelling and System Dynamics to derive a generic multi-methodology framework for modelling opponent behaviour in its context that can provide insights into the dynamics and resilience over time. It allows to combine detailed modelling, e.g. for the opponent organization, with high-level models, for example economic developments. Scenarios can be tailored for specific opponent problems ranging from insurgent situations in a military context to criminal gangs in a civil context.

Abstract: Governments are increasingly faced with challenges that present themselves as highly complex or ?wicked problems? (Rittel and Webber, 1973) . These problems are characterized by their strongly interdependent elements. They are typically not ?owned? by one organization, but instead have a myriad of stakeholders with different and sometimes conflicting perspectives on the system. Finally, these problems become especially challenging for areas related to security, where the complex systems being addressed are highly adaptive and covert. For over half a century, systems researchers have been working on developing formal approaches to help solve very complex problems. Different systems paradigms have emerged over the years, and are often labeled ?hard?, ?soft? and ?critical?. Hard systems (like system dynamics, system analysis, and system engineering), while designed to deal with multiple interacting variables, assume that the problem can definitively defined by an ?expert? practitioner and that optimal solutions can be achieved. Soft systems methods (SSM) were developed that rely more on qualitative methods and a focus on participation by all stakeholders to formulate the problem from multiple perspectives. Critical systems methods build on SSM by including methods that specifically address situations where there are conflicts among stakeholders and where some stakeholders hold an inordinate amount of power. This paper will summarize a multi-method Systemic Intervention methodology where soft and critical systems methods are used together with hard systems methods to develop interagency systemic strategies for countering transnational organized crime and its convergence with U.S. urban gang crime. Transnational crime organizations are becoming an increasingly complex and enduring threat globally. They pose a significant and growing domestic threat, especially through the influence they have on street gang crime in U.S. urban centers. Transnational crime groups and urban street gangs converge into an interdependent crime system that is highly adaptive and interconnected. They present an ever-evolving threat that cannot be addressed by breaking the problem into parts and addressing challenges independently within vertically structured agencies. Crime on the Urban Edge (CUE) is a research project being conducted at Argonne National Laboratory that is using 1) a critical systems method for participatory problem structuring that engages key stakeholders from local, regional, and federal perspectives and 2) and a computational hard systems method called AnticipatoRy Complex Adaptive Network Extrapolation (ARCANE). ARCANE is a genetic algorithm system for automatically generating system dynamics models that represent potential system adaptions. This model is being designed and developed for anticipating how wicked problem react under given disruptions or interventions. CUE illustrates a Goldilocks approach to wicked problems that is not hard, nor soft, but perhaps ?just right?.

Abstract: The importance of security has been increasingly recognized in the area of air transport. However, formal, mathematical, and computational approaches to modelling and analysis of security, in particular of its physical dimension (e.g., security of airports), are currently largely lacking. To address this gap, in this presentation a formal methodology for systematic security risk assessment of air transport sociotechnical systems is introduced. To handle environmental uncertainty and to provide a resilient response to disruptions, modern complex air transport systems combine elements of hierarchical top-down control and bottom-up self-organization. General Systems Theory is useful to model hierarchical systems, whereas Complex Adaptive Systems Theory and its prominent tool ? multiagent systems modelling ? are well-suited to describe self-organ.ization and bottom-up emergence. In the proposed methodology both theories are integrated to realistically represent and analyse by simulation security- and resilience-related aspects of sociotechnical systems in air transport. The methodology is illustrated by a case study in airport security