Abstract: During this interactive workshop, we will use simulation models about (potential) refugee crises. First, we will show how an exploratory system dynamics model on the Syrian-European refugee crisis (esp. the Balkan route) can be used interactively to provide high-level policy advice. The model and map-based animations we will be using were developed and used in November 2015. Going back to November 2015, we will use different techniques to assess and analyse effects of scenarios and potential policy options under deep uncertainty. Second, we will do this for potential future refugee crises. Sets of scenarios proposed by groups of workshop participants will be included into a simulation model to generate ensembles of plausible scenarios. We will visualize the effects of exemplar scenarios from these ensembles on maps and test policy options suggested by the workshop participants across all scenarios. Finally, we will use group model building techniques to develop a better understanding of the essence of migration as a security issue, and find structural policies.

Abstract: Military forces operate in an environment consisting of many intertwined influences, factors and actors that affect one another, complicating the situation and impacting stability. This presentation will discuss several concepts in order to make sense of this complex security environment and aims at challenging researchers to develop practical approaches that enable combining these concepts. We will discuss how the operational environment can be defined as a dynamic ecosystem consisting of flows between actors and factors that create the forces that influence the conflict. We will also introduce the concept of fighting in three landscapes, meaning that flows can be tackled in the physical landscape, the information landscape (cyber) and the human landscape (identity and beliefs that determine behaviour). In order to restore security, or enhance resilience before security deteriorates, we need to sufficiently understand and monitor these complex ecosystems. Furthermore to be effective in this complex environment a whole of society approach is needed in which military assets are only one of the effectors. Coordination in such a joint international, multi-agency, public (JIMP) setting creates many challenges of its own.

Abstract: The world is a complex adaptive system, that is to say a system of many component parts where the behaviour of the system cannot be inferred from the behaviour of the components in isolation. This is particularly true of combat when two or more intelligent parties are each trying to achieve advantage in a dynamic situation. These situations have been traditionally examined by the use of wargames, which require humans to make the decisions or simulations often based on scripts or simple rule sets to define the behaviour. Both of these methods mean that only a small subset of the possible ?phase space? of reasonable courses of action for each side in any given situation are explored. An imperfect but useful analogy would be that it?s like trying to understand chess from examining a small number of games. In order to address this, Dstl have been developing a tool ?Mission Planner? which will automatically generate courses of action for all sides within a simulation and respond to the perceived enemy responses. This should allow the automatic generation of a wide variety of courses of action for both sides given the same starting conditions and thus provide insight in to the range of outcomes possible. The talk will discuss the progress of the Mission Planner, describe its strengths and weaknesses, its future use and development.

Abstract: The complexity of our growing dependency on cyber systems increases the need to understand them in multi-faceted mathematical terms. Without a comprehensive and methodical understanding of these systems, unintended outcomes can be large and impactful. This creates a need for simple, analytically tractable yet practically insightful models for understanding these systems and their security. In this discussion, we start by building upon an existing model called FlipIt, extending it into a scenario involving a probabilistic attacker and defender playing for control over a resource. We then present an incomplete information game-theoretic model of the attacker-defender interaction. Using the martingale-based approach, we analytically solve the model for defender strategies. Afterward, we compare the analytical solution to a simulation and extend the simulation for cases that cannot be treated analytically. Finally, we compare and contrast with existing approaches based on Stackelberg equilibria.